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In America, lawsuits are morality plays. We are a secular soci-
ety of many cultures that holds its most important public rituals in
the courtroom. As we separate the guilty from the innocent, the
good guys from the bad guys, we symbolically reexamine, and
sometimes redefine, our official morality-the values that establish
us as a community.
This is the key point that has generally been overlooked by
the critics, including the present author,1 of courts in toxic tort
cases and other technical controversies.' Far more than fair and
efficiently delivered compensation for bodily injury is at issue in
these cases. Neither are these cases solely about issues of epidemi-
ology, toxicology, and oncology, though these sciences have an im-
portant role to play.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School B-A, 1970, J.D., 1974, Yale University. Member,
Bar of the District of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
author also serves as Special Litigation Counsel, Corporate Environmental Programs, Gen-
eral Electric Company, and as a Consultant on Mass Torts to Aetna Life Insurance Com-
pany. The views expressed in this article are the author's and not those of any-organization
or group.
1. See Elliott, Goal Analysis versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. L. J. 1357, 1374-75 (1985) [hereinafter Goal Analysis] (recommending that
other institutions should be substituted for case.by-case litigation before lay courts for most
toxic tort compensation claims); Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGA
STUD. 799, 801 (1985) [hereinafter Why Courts?].
2. Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual Problems and Proposed
Solutions, 24 Hous. L Rv. 155, 171-74 (1987); Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUL. L REv. 277, 322-35 (1985);
Huber, The Bhopalization of U.S. Tort Law, 2 IssuEs SCL & TEmc. 73 (Fall, 1985); Jasanoff
& Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 68 A.BA J. 1094,
1099 (1982). Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 94 HRv. L Rsv. 489, 550-52 (1981). See also Priest, Modern Tort
Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L Ray. 1, 10 (1987). See generally Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L, Rv. 555 (1985) (general overview and criticism of the present
tort law system).
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Toxic tort cases are about good and evil, about corporate
greed and indifference, and about the risk of the unknown.3 But
above all, toxic tort cases are about redefining our public morality
for a new era in which we must confront the troubling truth that
we do not fully comprehend the relationships between the things
that we have made and our health and well-being.
Because toxic tort cases raise fundamental issues of public
policy, we as a society will not, and probably should not, take these
controversies out of the courts at this point in our history4 and
turn them over to compensation funds, whether administered by
government or through private insurance.5 Toxic tort cases are still
too novel and too important to be left to panels of experts and
bureaucrats in either administrative agencies or insurance compa-
nies. They involve basic controversies over evolving public values;
these are fundamental political issues that experts have no greater
right to resolve than anyone else in a democratic society.6
But the fact that experts should not dictate decisions of these
issues to the rest of society does not imply, as many seem to think,
that only policy or value decisions matter and that science is irrele-
vant or unimportant. The fact that juries are deciding fundamental
issues of public morality in toxic tort cases is a compelling argu-
ment in favor of making sure that their verdicts are based on
"good science," not an argument against it. Getting the science
3. See E.D. Elliott, Science Panels in Toxic Tort Litigation: Why We Don't Use Them
22 (rev. ed. Feb. 8, 1988)(unpublished paper originally presented at the Cornell University
Institute for Comparative and Environmental Toxicology Conference "Immunotoxicology:
From Lab to Law" on October 16, 1987 [hereinafter Science Panels])("[T]oxic tort cases
today really are like White Collar Crime cases; they have a lot more to do with the morality
of the defendants' conduct than they do with estimating dose-response relationships."). See
also Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort
Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 883 (1987) ("Running through each of the principal problems
that tend to be raised by mass tort litigation, however, is the tension between the traditional
notion of individual responsibility and the expanded notion of collective responsibility.").
4. Professor David Rosenberg has made the point that case-by-case litigation "pro-
duced the informational and legal predicate for settling and trying tens of thousands" of
asbestos cases. Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation, Crisis or Chrysalis: A Comment on Fein-
berg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REv. 183, 189 (1987).
5. For a generally balanced discussion of the pros and cons of compensation funds and
case-by-case litigation of toxic tort cases, see Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort
System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987).
6. See Carter, The Bellman, The Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 358, 360-61 (1985)(discussing public distrust of scientists' judgment); Latin,
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 126-30
(1988) (value judgments important due to many uncertainties present in current regulatory
practice).
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right is necessary to frame the issues of value for juries to decide,
just as good science is necessary to frame the policy issues for po-
litical decisions in the regulatory process.7
To date, a false dichotomy between the political wisdom of
courts as the conscience of the community and the expertise and
efficiency of agencies has dominated the discussion of institutions
for dealing with issues of compensation for exposure to hazardous
substances in the environment. This article attempts to dissolve
that Hobson's choice. In fact, both courts and agencies have dis-
tinct advantages and disadvantages for dealing with issues of haz-
ardous substances in the environment. Rather than continuing to
debate a "no-win" choice between courts and compensation funds,
we need to develop new institutional arrangements that adapt the
best features of both courts and the administrative process to deal
with the problems of toxics in the environment. Techniques that
mesh judicial and administrative elements may be called hybrid
compensation systems. The idea is not to replace judges and ju-
ries, but to facilitate their deliberations by using the administra-
tive process to develop scientific information that can be used in
individual tort cases." We are beginning to develop such hybrid ap-
proaches to toxic compensation issues in practice.' This article
proposes one illustration of how such a hybrid approach to com-
pensation for exposure to toxic risk might work.
Institutional issues cannot be considered adequately, however,
without also considering substantive standards of liability.10 Proce-
7. Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENvm. L REP. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10190,
10194 (1984).
8. Atkeson, Toxics Regulation and Products Liability: Decreasing Exposure in the
Workplace, Increasing Exposure in the Courts. 13 ENVm. L. REP. (EnvtL L Inst.) 10418,
10418-19 (1983). See also STAFF OF SENATE COMtMt ON ENvnh. & PUB. WOaKS, 97th CoNG. 2D
SESS. SUPERFUND SEC. 301(E) STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAAES Fnom HAzARDOUS
WASTE& ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL RE tDIES 198-219 (Comm. Print 1982) [here-
inafter Grad Report](rebuttable presumption of causation based on Toxic Substances
Document).
9. Various examples of administrative-court hybrids are reviewed in E.D. Elliott, To-
ward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence
(March, 1988), Yale Law School Civil Liability Program Working Paper No. 76 [hereinafter
Three Approaches].
10. Some of my previous work has been justly criticized for attempting to address
institutional issues without considering the substantive legal standards that institutions
would apply. See Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L Rav. 1219, 1251 n.126
(1987)(criticizing Elliott, Goal Analysis versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensa-
tion Systems, 73 GEO. L. J. 1357 (1985)).
Farber's other criticism is not well-taken. He ridicules my statement that it is "rare
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dure and substance are inseparably intertwined in the law, and
therefore "it is going to be impossible to create procedures for de-
ciding toxic tort cases based on good science until we get straight
on... a substantive liability standard."11
In what follows, I focus first on substantive standards for com-
pensation. I will argue that several major distortions afflict toxic
tort litigation today. Some of these problems are well recognized,
such as the high cost and inherent inefficiency of case-by-case liti-
gation in court. 2 A problem that is not so well recognized, but
which is perhaps even more pernicious, is the effect of the tradi-
tional legal requirement that plaintiffs must prove that they are
more likely than not to have suffered physical injury in order to
recover.' 3 I will argue that this focus on physical injury as the vir-
tual sine qua non for recovery in toxic tort cases is an unfortunate
legal fiction that produces major distortions in the trial of these
cases, thereby exacerbating the flow of misinformation to the pub-
lic about the effects of chemicals on human health.
To improve the system, we must try to develop standards of
indeed that anything like the information base necessary to make even rough probability
estimates [of risk] will exist," Why Courts?, supra note 1, at 802, with the rejoinder "This
must have been welcome news to the Johns-Manville Corporation," a leading asbestos man-
ufacturer forced into bankruptcy by toxic tort liability. Farber, supra note 10, at 1251 n.127.
Nevertheless, in the very article that Farber cites, I specifically recognized that asbestos was
an "exception" because "exposure to a single silxstance dominates" the victim's risk portfo-
lio. Why Courts?, supra note 1, at 803. Farber himself goes on to recognize that asbestos is
exceptional in that it causes "signature diseases" which are extremely rare. Farber, supra, at
1251-52. For further descriptions of why asbestos is atypical, see Abraham & Merrill, Scien-
tific Uncertainty in the Courts, ISSUES SCL & TECH. 93, 101 (Winter 1986).
11. Science Panels, supra note 3, at 22.
12. J. Kakalik, P. Ebener, W. Felstiner & M. Shanley, Costs of Asbestos Litigation vii
(Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1983) (Table S.2)(victims receive only 37% of total costs paid
by defendants and insurers); Feinberg, supra note 2, at 159-64. See also Wellington, Asbes-
tos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLv. ST. L. REv. 375, 376-78 (1984-
85).
Professor Rosenberg's argument that the high costs for asbestos cases in the Rand
study are exaggerated by "start-up" costs is probably correct, but that is clearly insufficient
to explain away the enormous disparity in transaction costs between litigation and other
compensation systems. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 166. Other studies of the tort system
have found transaction costs approximately equal to the amounts of compensation deliv-
ered, as opposed to roughly twice as high as in the Rand asbestos study. In either case, the
costs of litigation are much higher than other compensation systems. See U.S. DEPT. TRANS-
PORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH Loss AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 94-
100 (1971), quoted in R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
951, 952 (4th ed. 1984).
13. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986)(stating the traditional "more likely than not" rule).
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liability that more closely approximate the community's prevailing
moral norms. This implies that courts should begin to recognize a
cause of action for involuntary exposure to the risk of chemical
injury, which is separate and distinct from the physical injuries
that can be proved to result from chemical exposure.
In the second part of the article, I turn to institutional issues,
considering the reasons that lie behind the curious evolution of our
legal institutions for dealing with chemicals in the environment
and arguing that the future of toxic torts should not be either
courts or compensation funds, but hybrid systems that combine
the best of both.
I CHEMOPHOBIA AND RISK AS A COMPENSABLE INJURY
Americans have a widespread, irrational fear of chemicals, a
phenomenon which I shall call chemophobia.14 Although what sci-
ence knows about chemicals in the environment suggests that they
are actually a relatively minor source of risks to our health,'" many
Americans are nonetheless very concerned about toxic chemicals.
While I have no firm evidence to back up this speculation, I
believe that one factor stimulating our collective chemophobia is
press coverage of toxic tort cases and precautionary government
regulatory actions.16 Hardly a day goes by without headlines re-
porting either some new government action against a substance
that supposedly causes cancer, or a multi-million dollar jury ver-
dict in a toxic tort case. Is it any wonder, then, that much of our
population is convinced that "everything causes cancer"?
Prevailing standards of substantive law in toxic tort cases are
stimulating an increasing flow of misinformation to the public
about the risks of chemicals in the environment. The reasons are
clear. Normally, in our current legal system, persons who have
been involuntarily exposed to chemicals are allowed to recover
14. See generally R WHELAN, Toxic TERROR 19-23 (1985) (noting and criticizing the
proponents of a "poison conspiracy" based on a parallel between the general increase in
cancer cases and the deterioration of the environment); M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAvSKy. RISK
AND CULTURE- AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 10-
11 (1982) (society's present sectarian outlook views industrialization as a conspiracy intent
on technological contamination of the body of nature and of man).
15. See Ames, Magaw, & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 ScL 271,
277 (1987).
16. See Elliott, Book Review, 92 YALE L J. 888, 896-97 (1983) (reviewing M. DOUGLAS




compensation only if they claim that they have suffered bodily in-
juries. 17 As a consequence, only several years ago, most knowledge-
able lawyers thought that it would be very difficult to win chemical
exposure cases under traditional principles of tort law."8 Except
where exposure to a toxic substance causes a rare disease with vir-
tually no other known causes,19 conventional science generally can-
not make the showing traditionally required by tort law-namely,
that it is more likely than not that a particular plaintiff's illness
was caused by exposure to a particular substance. 0
When applied to chemical exposures, the traditional tort stan-
dard of proof is unduly harsh and unreasonable. In theory, it
places the entire burden of scientific uncertainty on the plaintiff.
This has extremely unfortunate consequences. First, the unreason-
ably. demanding standard of traditional tort law virtually compels
plaintiffs' lawyers to use experts who will distort the available sci-
entific evidence - or, at the very least, present a very extreme
view of what the available evidence shows - in order to get to the
jury in toxic tort cases.2" For example, plaintiffs in toxic tort cases
are increasingly relying on testimony by a small group of profes-
sional witnesses called "clinical ecologists" (whose views are repu-
17. Recently a few doctrines have begun to develop which expand on the traditional
focus on physical injury. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987)
(medical monitoring); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-15 (5th
Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986)(persons exposed to asbestos, who have a
probability greater than 50% of developing cancer in the future, can recover for risk of
cancer); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing persons
exposed to asbestos to recover for fear of developing cancer in the future). To date, however,
physical injury tends to remain the primary claim in most toxic tort cases.
18. Udall, Toxic Chemicals and Radiation, 38 MERCER L. RE V. 511, 517 (1987); Gins-
berg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 859, 922-25 (1981). See also Grad Report, supra note 8, at 55-56.
19. For a description of the factors that determine whether conventional science can
relate diseases to particular chemical exposures, see Goal Analysis, supra note 1, at 1369-
1372 (rare disease, with relatively few known causes, and a clear exposure route). See also
Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732,
769-70 (1984) (courts have generally accepted epidemiological evidence in cases involving
diseases caused by viruses or bacteria). Recently, the term signature diseases has been
coined to describe a few diseases, such as mesothelioma, following asbestos exposure, which
can be reliably related to chemical exposure because they have virtually no other known
causes. Abraham & Merrill, supra note 10, at 101; Farber, supra note 10, at 1251-52.
20. Refer to note 13 supra and accompanying text.
21. For an exceptional case in which the court granted summary judgment despite the
existence of several expert affidavits for the plaintiffs, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd, 818 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1987),
appeal pending. The evidence of causation is no stronger in many cases that go to juries
and result in plaintiffs' verdicts.
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diated by the scientific establishment).22 Lay juries and the public
are vulnerable to being misled by such "experts.12 3
Even more important, however, the standard of proof theoreti-
cally required in toxic tort cases is so harsh and unrealistic that
many juries will not abide by it. In a few exceptional cases, such as
asbestos, the scientific evidence is overwhelming. But by and large,
plaintiffs are winning large verdicts in toxic tort cases not because
it is easier to make the scientific showing which is theoretically re-
quired; instead, today's plaintiffs are winning toxic tort cases be-
cause juries are nullifying the formal law2' and holding defendants
liable even in the absence of persuasive proof of causation that
meets the theoretical standards of tort law. The traditional rule of
tort law, that it is "unfair to require an individual to pay for an-
other's tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not
that he caused it,"'25 no longer captures our society's prevailing
sense of justice in cases where innocent people have been involun-
tarily exposed to substances that are potentially dangerous to their
health.26
A hypothetical example may help to illustrate why juries are
refusing to follow the traditional tort standard in toxics cases.21
Suppose that before the session today I sneaked into the room and
put some white powder from my daughter's chemistry set into the
water pitchers from which the audience has been drinking. I then
said to you: "I don't know what it was, and I don't know if it will
harm you. It's your problem. You prove that whatever I put into
22. Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 SCL 1490, 1491 (1986); Science and Toxic
Tort Law: Novel Strategies in the Woburn Litigation, 1 Toxic L. REP. 374 (BNA) (Sept. 10,
1986)[hereinafter Novel Strategies]. For an extended discussion of the role of clinical ecol-
ogy in toxic tort litigation, see Three Approaches supra note 9, at 5-12.
23. Address by J. Weinstein, ABA Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 9, 1987):
[A]n expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory,
no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid summary
judgment and forcing the matter to trial. At the trial itself, an expert'a testimony
can be used to obfuscate what would otherwise be a simple case... Juries and
judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by such experts-for-hire.
24. See generally M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRrION To Dmsona: A STUDY Os, LAW-
FUL DEPARTURES FRoM LEGAL RuLEs 45-66 (1973)(discussing jury readiness to abandon ap-
plicable legal doctrine, even in criminal cases); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to
Say No, 45 S. CAL L REV. 168 (1972)(historical perspective on jury nullification).
25. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.Supp. 740, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afld,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)(appeal pending).
26. Why Courts?, supra note 1, at 800.




your water did something bad to you. If you can't, then I haven't
done anything wrong."
Those of you who have been drinking the water might feel
that I had done something wrong, even if no one ever proved that
your health had been adversely affected by the incident. You
would justifiably feel that your right to bodily autonomy had been
violated, that I had turned you into "human guinea pigs" without
your consent. As a general matter, if a person's body has been in-
vaded and she has been subjected without her consent to an avoid-
able and uncompensated risk, including the risk of uncertainty as
to what the ultimate consequences to health may be, she has been
injured in a way that should be compensated by the legal system
where possible. Two distinct harms are involved when people are
exposed to chemicals without their consent: (1) the involuntary ex-
posure to risk; and (2) any physical harm to health that may be
provable.
I think that juries in toxic tort cases intuitively understand
this distinction. Normally, juries feel that it is morally wrong to
put trichloroethylene (TCE) into someone's well water, even if to-
day's best scientists can't yet say for sure whether the TCE actu-
ally caused the leukemia in the children who drank the water from
the well.28 As a result, the central issue that is actually litigated in
today's toxic tort cases is not the formal legal/scientific issue: "can
the plaintiff prove that it is more likely than not that there is a
causal connection between exposure to a particular substance and
a particular disease." Rather, today's toxic tort cases are really
white-collar crime cases; they have a lot more to do with the mo-
rality of the defendants' conduct than they do with estimating
dose-response relationships.
In part, this is as it should be. The common law has tradition-
ally recognized that serious bodily injury itself and the threat of
serious bodily injury are two separate, compensable harms. The
traditional distinction is between assault, which consists of putting
someone in fear of serious bodily injury, and battery, which con-
sists of actually striking them.2" My sometime colleague at Yale,
the philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson, has written on this clear
28. See Novel Strategies, supra note 22, at 378-80.
29. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). In civil, as
opposed to criminal, law, even pointing an unloaded revolver at someone which puts them in
fear of harm constitutes an actionable assault. See G. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 53 (1983).
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distinction between the risk of injury and the injury itself."
My objection is not that juries are compensating plaintiffs for
involuntary exposure to risks but that the formal law forces juries
to compensate for involuntary exposure to risk under the guise
that it is awarding damages for proven bodily harm. This charade
serves to reinforce public misperceptions and chemophobia.
We should purge toxic tort law of the unfortunate and legally
anomalous doctrine that no harm is suffered unless the plaintiff
can prove that it is more likely than not that involuntary exposure
to the chemical caused a recognized disease or other form of physi-
cal harm. The violation of a person's bodily autonomy, the affront
to one's dignity that occurs when one is assaulted with a poten-
tially hazardous chemical, is also an injury that the law should rec-
ognize and compensate.
Of course, the difficulty would be in putting a price on intangi-
ble injuries of this type. Perhaps it would help to remind ourselves
that juries put prices on intangible injuries such as these every
day, but that is certainly not a completely satisfactory answer. Pre-
vious legal authors who have advocated compensation for risk have
tried to value risk solely by evaluating the likelihood of physical
injury.31 Although the likelihood of physical harm is obviously a
relevant factor, it is not the only factor that should be considered
when determining fair compensation for involuntary exposure to
risk. Persons who have been unreasonably exposed, without their
consent, to chemicals that may be hazardous, are entitled to be
compensated for the violation of their personal autonomy and dig-
nity, and their justifiable fear and uncertainty, even if it later turns
out that the risks to their physical health are trivial or nonexistent.
Moreover, focusing exclusively on provable risks of physical injury,
as these authors advocate, places the entire cost of scientific uncer-
tainty on the victim, which is "a result as inefficient as it is
unfair."32
30. THOMSON, Imposing Risks, in RIGHTS, RESIrrTrUTzoN & Rim- ESSAYS IN MoRAL THE-
ORY 173, 191 (W. Parent ed. 1986). "[The most that can be said of (the workman in a risky
factory] is this: knowing the factory is risky, he consents to work in it." Id.
31. Farber, supra note 10, at 1243-51; Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Com-
pensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 786 (1985); Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAav.
L. Rav. 849 (1984); Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic
Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 425-31 (1984); Estep, Radiation Injuries and Sta-
tistics: The Need for a New Approach, 59 MIcH. L Rav. 259, 262-68 (1960).
32. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv.
1988]
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Paying larger numbers of people some compensation for invol-
untary exposure to chemical risks would not necessarily cost more
than the present system - in which a few plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases recover enormous verdicts. In arriving at a fair valuation for
involuntary exposure to risk, juries could be directed to consider
the actual level of risk that arises from chemical exposures in rela-
tion to other risks that we normally encounter in our every day
lives. 3 This could bring a welcome note of realism to the evidence
in toxic tort cases.-" Alternatively, in a form of hybrid compensa-
tion system, generic estimates of the risks to health associated with
various levels of exposure to particular chemicals could be devel-
oped through administrative rulemaking and introduced as evi-
dence in court.3 5
II. THE CURIOUS EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
Comparing environmental institutions today with those of two
decades ago produces a curious sense of deja vu. Now, as then,
courts are struggling with issues on the frontiers of science. In the
interim, of course, a vast regulatory bureaucracy has been created
to set and enforce environmental standards. The curiosity from a
historical perspective, however, is not that "expert agencies" such
as the EPA (and OSHA, CPSC, etc.) were developed in the 1970's
to deal with highly technical issues of environmental law. Rather,
the oddity is that, after creating the expert environmental agencies
in the 1970s, we have chosen in the 1980s to "return to common
law" 36 - to case-by-case litigation before traditional courts - as
the mainstay for making much of our legal policy relating to chem-
icals in the environment. The regulatory apparatus still exists, but
L. REV. 1329, 1349-50 (1971). (discussing a famous hypothetical in which too large a share of
accident costs are allocated to a bus company). If plaintiffs must bear the full burden of
uncertainty, too little of the costs of chemical injuries will be borne by defendants.
33. See Ames, Magaw, & Gold, supra note 15, at 276-77.
34. In some recent cases, defendants have successfully introduced comparative risk
assessments. Munter & DeVries, Higgins v. Aerojet Corporation: Successfully Defending a
Toxic Tort Case, 1 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 874, 875-76 (Jan. 14, 1987).
35. Cf. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2059, § 7(b)(1) (1983), 42 U.S.C.
§ 241 note (1982) (directs Health and Human Services to prepare radio-epidemiological ta-
bles estimating probability that persons exposed to various doses of radiation from atmo-
spheric testing of atomic weapons will develop cancer).
36. See J. BONINE & T. McGARrrv, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CASES,
LEGISLATION, POLICIES 1007-08 (1984) (part of the rationale for creating regulatory agencies
was "to get the courts out of the business of setting environmental policy on an ad hoc
basis," but the case-by-case common law is still a viable alternative).
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it is the courts in toxic tort cases, natural resources damage actions
under CERCLA, and judicial review of administrative action that
increasingly constitute the law's "cutting edge." Courts in these
cases are struggling to deal with issues on the frontiers of science
and technology just as they were twenty years ago in cases like
Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,37 prior
to the creation of EPA. Over the last two decades, the center of
gravity for policymaking about chemicals in the environment has
shifted from courts to administrative agencies, but now seems to
be shifting back to the courts. This poses an embarrassing question
for those of us"' who believe that administrative institutions are
inherently superior to courts for resolving policy questions with
important technical and scientific components: If administrative
agencies are so great, why are they being rejected by history?
A. The Theoretical Superiority of Administrative Institutions
Let us begin by considering why, in theory, administrative in-
stitutions are inherently superior to case-by-case litigation in
courts as mechanisms for dealing with issues of toxic substances in
the environment.
The essential difference between courts and administrative
agencies is that courts have certain fundamental institutional char-
acteristics that cannot be altered, whereas administrative agencies
created by statute can assume virtually any form imaginable. By
definition, a court consists of lay judges and juries who decide
cases between identifiable plaintiffs and defendants. The defining
characteristic of administrative agencies, on the other hand, is that
they are not alike.3" The concept of an "administrative agency" is
one of the weakest residual categories in American law; we call any
governmental entity that makes or applies law but is not a tradi-
tional court, legislature, or executive department an "administra-
tive agency."
The theoretical superiority of administrative institutions to
37. 514 F.2d 492, 500, 519 (8th Cir. 1975).
38. See Goal Analysis, supra note 1, at 1375; Why Courts?, supra note 1, at 804-05.
39. The variability of administrative institutions should be obvious to anyone who has
listened to the debate about administrative compensation systems for toxic exposures: con-
servatives oppose them because the Black Lung program "proves" that administrative pro-
grams pay too much to claimants; liberals oppose them because worker's compensation pro-
grams "prove" that administrative programs pay too little to claimants. They can't both be
right. Why Courts?, supra note 1, at 804.
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deal with policy questions with significant components of a scien-
tific nature flows from the fact that the institutional characteristics
of administrative entities are variable, while those of courts are
more fixed. Proponents of administrative alternatives to traditional
litigation have recommended a number of modifications which, in
theory, ought to improve the performance of governmental institu-
tions dealing with problems relating to chemicals in the environ-
ment. Most of these suggestions focus on two central features of
courts: lay decisionmakers and case-by-case adjudication of contro-
versies. By incorporating various forms of "expertness" in place of
lay decisionmaking and by shifting the focus from adversary litiga-
tion of particular cases to generic policymaking, proponents of the
administrative institutions hoped to improve the legal process for
dealing with problems of chemicals in the environment.
On the other hand, those who maintain that courts are supe-
rior to agencies for dealing with these questions, are reduced to the
claim that courts, if not perfect, are at least the optimal institution
imaginable.40 Any statutory change in the fundamental institu-
tional features of courts (which would, by definition, convert them
into agencies) would therefore detract from their performance. So
40. For example, Don Stever suggests that judges and juries do just fine at handling
scientific controversies, citing a comment by the Chairman of the Department of Epidemiol-
ogy at Johns Hopkins, Dr. Leon Gordis, that Judge Weinstein's opinions in the Agent Or-
ange case showed a good understanding of epidemiological evidence. Stever, Remedies for
Hazardous or Toxic-Substance-Related Personal Injury, 25 Hous. L. REv. 801, 813 n.72. I
think that Dr. Gordis's remarks actually support just the opposite conclusion: apparently it
is sufficiently rare that judges and lawyers "get their epidemiology right" that Dr. Gordis
considers it worth mentioning that an individual case could be found in which the trial
judge did a pretty good job of handling scientific evidence. In any event, Agent Orange was
an extraordinary case and Judge Weinstein is an extraodinary trial judge. See P. ScliUcK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 12-13 (1986).
The appeal in Agent Orange was more typical of the usual judicial tendency to distort
or misunderstand the import of technical evidence. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldart, Law and
Science Policy in Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde, 222 SCIENCE 894 (Nov. 25, 1983). At
oral argument the Second Circuit misunderstood and dismissed the very epidemiological
evidence that Dr. Gordis found persuasive. For example, Judge Ralph Winter offered the
following grossly simplistic criticism (which is totally innocent of the concept of dose-re-
sponse relationship): "What good are studies that show that veterans exposed to Agent Or-
ange do not suffer these diseases in any greater proportion than the civilian population of
the United States, when in fact it may be the case that the proportion of the civilian popu-
lation of the United States exposed to these chemicals may be roughly the same proportion
as Viet Nam veterans who were exposed to these chemicals?" Transcript of Argument, In
Re "Agent Orange" (Nos. 84-6273 etc. 2d Cir., April 9, 1986) at p. 53. The court of appeals
pointedly refused to endorse Judge Weinstein's analysis of the epidemiological studies, and
affirmed on an alternate ground. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F. 2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987), app. pending.
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framed, the procourt position is theoretically dubious. It seems un-
likely that any human institution, particularly one that deals with
a broad range of controversies, is so perfectly suited to every task
that it cannot be improved.
B. "None of This Would Have Happened If We Had Invented
Administrative Agencies."
To me, the abstract, theoretical case that one could improve
on the performance of courts by greater infusions of expertise and
by expanding the focus for policymaking beyond the artificial
framework of a "case" is compelling.41 Contrast these abstract, the-
oretical advantages of administrative institutions, however, with
the actual record of administrative decisionmaking during, for ex-
ample, the Gorsuch era at the EPA, and the case for administra-
tive institutions becomes much less clear. For the moment, leave
aside whether the Gorsuch EPA was really as bad as the press
made it out to be. In politics, appearances are reality, and the un-
deniable political reality is that, when it comes to credibility, ad-
ministrative institutions have lost out to courts - with the public
and the Congress - in recent years.
There are several reasons for this widening "credibility gap."
First, to a significant degree, our culture no longer recognizes the
authority of experts. According to modern philosophers of science,
there is no such thing as a scientific truth that is absolute and im-
mutable.42 This perspective, sound in itself, has been carried to ri-
diculous extremes of know-nothing-ism by people who contend
that because there is no absolute truth, then anyone's opinion on a
question of scientific fact is equally likely to be true.' This posi-
tion is as destructive as it is illogical, but it commands many ad-
herents today. Many of us now believe that the judgment of a lay
jury on what caused a particular cancer stands as good a chance of
being correct as that of a panel of the National Academy of Sci-
ences. Science is seen as another form of politics. In such a popu-
list, anti-intellectual milieu, proposals to substitute "experts" for
juries are not seen as merely misguided but as evidence of a con-
41. Science Panels, supra note 3, at 8, 12.
42. See, e.g., T. KUHN, TIM STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 3-7 (2d ed. 1970).




spiracy by the barons of industry and their running dogs."
In addition, there are also institutional causes for the loss of
faith in administrative decisionmaking. It is hard to argue that ac-
tual decisions by administrative agencies in the United States are
entitled to whatever deference scientific expertise still commands.
For example, five case studies of standard-setting in the health and
safety area prior to the Reagan administration concluded that
"data and analysis are not the sole basis for setting standards; in-
deed, they often do not even serve as an important resource.'4 5
The history of administrative regulation in the environmental area
is largely a history of regulatory decisions made on political
grounds, than rationalized on scientific ones.46
Perhaps this is as it should be. Perhaps decision by "experts"
is too undemocratic for the United States, particularly where emo-
tional issues of health and safety are involved. Perhaps a wise deci-
sion was made in 1970 when it was decided to place EPA under a
single politically-responsible administrator. The consequence of
these institutional decisions has been, however, to reinforce the po-
litical nature of administrative decisions in the environmental area.
And the palpably political nature of administrative decisions in the
environmental area has in turn led the public and the Congress to
look back to the courts for decisions that are perceived as rela-
tively insulated from politics,4 7 even if ill-informed.
The mixed record of administrative decisionmaking in the
health and safety area cannot be considered a refutation of the
New Deal Ideal of administrative decisions based on expertise and
insulated from political control;' the truth is that the New Deal
44. See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT- THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 312.
14 (1985) (proposals for administrative compensation systems portrayed as an attempt by
industry to escape tort liability).
45. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGU-
LATION 16 (Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity, R. Crandall & L. Lave eds.
(1981) (emphasis added).
46. See E. Burger, Human Health: A Surrogate for the Environment, The Evolution of
Environmental Legislation and Regulation During the 1970's 16 (unpublished paper origi-
nally presented at the Cornell University Institute for Comparative and Environmental
Toxicology Conference "Immunotoxicology: From Lab to Law")(Oct. 16, 1987).
47. See Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581
(1985) (Central purpose of Article III courts provide independent assessment of acts of
government).
48. For further elaboration on the New Deal Ideal, see generally B. ACKERMAN & W.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 4-6 (1981) (New Deal Ideal of administrative decisionmak-
ing defined by affirmation of expertise, agency insulation from central political control, and
insulation from judicial oversight).
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Ideal of decisions based on administrative expertise has never been
tried, at least not in the United States.
In a real sense, American law still has not managed to invent
the administrative agency, at least not in the ideal form envisioned
by James Landis and the other New Deal reformers. Instead, these
reformers compromised their creations, from the moment of their
birth, with consequences that are still being felt. Rather than ac-
knowledge that the entities created by statute in the 1930's and
1970's represented new types of legal institutions not envisaged by
the framers of the Constitution, activist lawyers attempted to legit-
imate their creations by a legal fiction called the "delegation doc-
trine." The basic strategy has been to deny that administrative
agencies represent anything fundamentally new in American law
by analogizing them to traditional parts of the executive branch.
Over time, however, this fiction tends to become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. American lawyers find it increasingly difficult to imagine
insulating administrative decisions from political control - be-
cause administrative agencies are in the executive branch.
One illustration of the long-term consequences of the unholy
compromise struck in creating the administrative agency is the so-
called Morgan doctrine.49 Most of us who teach environmental law
sense that judicial review of the technical facts underlying admin-
istrative decisions has become a joke. Administrators reach their
decisions on political grounds, then instruct their lawyers to write
opinions rationalizing them in terms of the relevant scientific and
technical facts. Under Morgan, courts are restricted to reviewing
the adequacy of the written opinion rationalizing the decision; ex-
cept in exceptional circumstances, they may not inquire into what
factors were actually taken into account in reaching a decision.
This creates the bizarre prospect that courts must defer to the sci-
entific and technical expertise of an agency ruling even when the
agency's own scientists disagreed but were overruled by the politi-
cal appointees who made the final decision.
This doctrine applies to administrative decisions in the envi-
ronmental area, not because courts have decided that it makes
sense in this context but because courts developed the principle
that it was inappropriate to "probe the mind of the deci-
sionmaker" in the context of cabinet officials. Because the legal fic-
tion of the delegation doctrine insists that the EPA is "just like"
49. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
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the Secretary of Transportation, courts have applied the Morgan
doctrine to a broad range of administrative agencies. The conse-
quence is that courts are powerless to reverse the dominance of
politics over expertise.
C. The Ritual Significance of "Judgment in a Court of Law"
There is a second reason - perhaps really just a corollary of
the first - that explains why Congress and the public have been
inclined to prefer judicial to administrative decisions when issues
of compensation are concerned. Imagine the perfect compensation
decision rendered by a neutral administrative expert. Such a deci-
sion would use expert knowledge to implement the governing legal
standard for fair and efficient compensation. The goal would be to
pay no one too little, and no one too much, while keeping transac-
tion costs to a minimum.
Now contrast this image of antiseptic, neat, and soulless bu-
reaucratic efficiency in delivering mathematically correct compen-
sation to claimants with the agony and fury of the Woburn mother
who has lost her only child to leukemia and brings a toxic tort case
against those she perceives as responsible. Her stated goal is to
give some meaning to her own suffering by making sure that no
other mother will ever have to go through what she has endured.
There is a fundamental mismatch between the ideal of admin-
istrative expertise and efficiency and the symbolic and political is-
sues that underlie claims for compensation from exposure to toxic
substances. The Woburn mother, like the Agent Orange vet and
the asbestos widow, is seeking to make a point about morality,
about good and evil, and about callousness toward the risks of
causing great suffering to other human beings. For the Woburn
mother and the others, the prompt and efficient award of just com-
pensation is not the point; instead, money is a way of keeping
score. They view toxic tort litigation as a form of politics. They
simply do not share the goal of minimizing transaction costs, which
appeals to many of us in industry and the academy.
Those who perceive themselves as the victims of industrial
atrocities reject the notion that they should be bought off quietly,
out of sight and out of mind in some obscure government or pri-
vate "compensation program." They demand the right to call those
whom they perceive as their tormentors to account in the ritual
setting in which our society has traditionally held such public mo-
rality plays - a courtioom before a jury of their peers.
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For people who view toxic tort litigation this way - my col-
league Jerry Mashaw calls it the "guerilla warfare" view"0 - there
is no such thing as an error by a jury in a toxic tort case; whatever
the jury decides is, by definition, correct because the jury is the
representative of the community.
Democracy is a fine thing, but as we should have learned when
men feared witches and burned women, there are also risks to de-
ciding important public issues based on popular prejudices and su-
perstitions. Jury verdicts in cancer cases, decided only a generation
ago, have a similarly superstitious smell today - everything from
cuts and bruises to sand has been found by a jury somewhere to
have caused cancer. The verdicts in these cases were usually af-
firmed on appeal.51 I suspect that many of today's toxic tort ver-
dicts will appear similarly primitive when future observers look
back on them.
What's wrong with this? One answer to this question, of
course, is that defendants - usually corporations or insurance
companies - end up paying for some injuries that they did not
cause. This is unfortunate, but if this were the only issue, perhaps
the problem of erroneous jury verdicts would not be too serious.
Because traditional rules of tort law cast the entire burden of un-
certainty on the victim and because causation is often difficult to
prove, corporations and insurance companies do not pay for all the
injuries that they do cause.
To me, the more compelling objection to verdicts that are not
based on good science is premised on the idea that the courts are
the forum in which our society holds ritual morality plays to rede-
fine and reaffirm its collective vision of public values. What takes
place in the courtrooms of this country is reported in the press and
becomes a major determinant of how the public views issues of
risk. If the American people are ever going to have a more in-
formed, mature, and balanced attitude toward the risks of chemi-
cals in the environment, toxic tort litigation, like other forms of
our public discourse, must educate the public, not pander to its
fears and prejudices.52
50. Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerilla Warfare, 73 GO.
L J. 1393, 1395 (1985).
51. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 19, at 739-741 & nn.18.29 (collecting cases).
52. Cf. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L J. 455,
500-01 (1984)(the courts offer society an opportunity to second-guess itself and learn from
its mistakes); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L REv. 193,
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III. TOWARD "HYBRID" COMPENSATION INSTITUTIONS
In light of the real strengths and weaknesses that affect both
traditional litigation and traditional administrative compensation
systems, I do not believe that either "alternative" in its pure form
will constitute the future's answer to the problem of compensation
for exposure to toxic substances in the environment. Rather, we
seem to be moving toward an institutional synthesis which incor-
porates aspects of both traditional litigation and the administra-
tive process.
There are many signs of this evolution toward "hybrid" insti-
tutions for dealing with toxic compensation claims. In bankruptcy
proceedings and class action suits, for example, courts are increas-
ing adopting techniques developed in the administrative process to
deal with mass claim processing and reduce transaction costs. 3
A more striking sign that "hybrid" institutional solutions are
developing is the growing use of administrative "science panels" to
make generic assessments of risks that can be used as evidence in
individual tort cases. A number of these hybrid compensation sys-
tems, using administrative science panels to develop generic scien-
tific evidence for use in individual tort cases, are evolving. 4 Epide-
miological studies by the federal Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) have been accepted by the courts as evidence and have be-
come the mainstays of the plaintiffs' cases for toxic shock syn-
drome55 and swine flu.56 A recent statute mandates the federal De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to compile
estimates of the probability that persons exposed to various levels
of radiation from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons will de-
velop cancer.57 The 1986 amendments to the "Superfund" statute
mandate the. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR),55 to compile toxicological profiles on the one hundred
208 (1952) (Supreme Court Justices are "teachers in a vital national seminar").
53. See McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and
Trends Affecting Management, 19 FORUM 1, 5 (1983)(detailing a trend toward streamlining
legal processes with centralized rule-making systems).
54. The discussion of hybrid compensation systems that follows is adapted from Three
Approaches, supra note 9, at 35-38.
55. Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 1983).
56. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F.Supp. 897, 907 (D.Colo.
1981), aff'd sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983).
57. Refer to note 35 supra.
58. Until recently, the Agency for Toxic Substances was part of Center for Disease
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most significant hazardous substances.59 These "tox profiles" are to
include an "interpretation of available toxicological information
and epidemiologic evaluations. . . in order to ascertain the levels
of significant human exposure... and the associated... health
effects." 60 In essence, then, ATSDR is to provide an official distilla-
tion of the scientific literature and to define what health problems
are known to be caused by dangerous chemicals and what levels of
exposure are needed to produce adverse effects on health. This
amounts to generic expert testimony by a neutral administrative
science panel which may be admitted in order to guide the jury's
consideration of partisan expert testimony. In addition, ATSDR
also has discretionary authority to "perform health assessment for
releases [of hazardous wastes from facilities where] . . . individuals
have been exposed." 1 This means that ATSDR can be called in to
study a group of plaintiffs who claim to have been injured by expo-
sure to hazardous wastes.
How well these generic risk assessments by administrative sci-
ence panels will work, and what effect they will ultimately have on
litigation in the courts, remains to be seen. There are obvious diffi-
culties to drawing conclusions in specific cases from generic infor-
mation. In addition, at least in the regulatory context, administra-
tive agencies are often influenced by political considerations rather
than "good science." 62 Moreover, in the past, courts have been un-
receptive to the development of specialized administrative institu-
tions which could aid them by providing an independent assess-
ment of questions of scientific fact. 3
While the development of administrative science panels to
work in conjunction with courts and juries is obviously no panacea,
the future of toxic torts lies in hybrid compensation systems and
the recognition of involuntary exposure to risk as a compensable
injury.
Control but is now a separate agency.
59. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, § 110(3)(A), (42 US.C.
§ 9604(i)(3)(A)(Supp. IV 1986)).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
62. Refer to notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text; see Latin, supra note 6, at 94.
63. See American Petroleum Institute v. Castle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1737 (1982) (review of revised ozone standard by EPA Science Advi-
sory Board was not necessary, since SAB's role is "merely advisory").
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